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USING HAPPINESS SURVEYS TO VALUE 






Inhabitants of houses near Amsterdam Airport are complaining of noise nuisance, caused by 
aircraft traffic. The usual assumption is that the effect of the externality will be perfectly 
reflected by house price differentials. This is based on the implicit assumption that there is a 
well-functioning housing market. If that is not true, we need a correction method in order to 
assess the intangible damage. We assess the monetary value of the noise damage, caused by 
aircraft noise nuisance around Amsterdam Airport as the sum of hedonic price differentials 
and a residual cost component. The residual costs are assessed from a survey, including an 
ordinal life satisfaction scale, on which individual respondents have scored. The derived 
compensation scheme depends on, among other things, the objective noise level, income, the 
degree to which prices account for noise differences, and the presence of noise insulation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Many city dwellers are painfully aware of a nearby airport, as they suffer from aircraft noise. The area 
around Amsterdam Airport (Schiphol) is no exception. Air traffic has heavily expanded since the 
airport started operating in 1926. Since the 1960s, the local population has become noise-conscious as 
a result of the exponentially growing air traffic and the environmentalist awakening. Similar problems 
exist for many airports all over the world. In the last years a fierce discussion developed on the 
question whether Schiphol should be allowed to expand still further, and whether the local inhabitants 
in the Greater Amsterdam Area should be compensated in money for the growing noise nuisance. A 
major question is then which money amount seems justified. 
This paper proposes a new method of measuring the value of intangibles, the key and normally most 
controversial element in social cost benefit analysis.  The standard procedure is to infer shadow prices 
from market data.  For example, Walters (1975) discusses how to convert the discount in the price of 
houses in the vicinity of an airport into a valid estimate of the monetary cost of aircraft noise.  This 
approach has its difficulties. Even under ideal conditions, price differentials reflect the cost to the least 
noise tolerant of all those affected by the noise.  Obtaining reliable estimates of how intra-marginal 
types are affected is tricky.  Moreover, when, as is often true, house process and rents are controlled 
the procedure completely breaks down. Its applicability is also questionable if residents face 
significant switching costs, especially if their ability to make unbiased long-term predictions of their 
circumstances and preferences is doubtful. Although it is not denied that price differentials may cover 
part of the value of the intangibles, another part of the cost may not be revealed. Therefore, we need a 
complementary instrument. 
The complementary instrument developed here is based on the use of happiness surveys, increasingly 
becoming accepted as a powerful tool of welfare economics
2.  In essence, an equation explaining 
happiness as a function of income, noise and other variables is estimated.  The change in income 
necessary to compensate for a specified change in noise then drops out immediately.  If the strict 
assumptions of a well-functioning housing market would apply then (ignoring heterogeneity) no 
relationship should exist between noise and happiness because house prices fully adjust to 
compensate. However, due to the rationing on the market and the fact that residents face significant 
switching costs, in practice this equilibrium frequently does not hold and there are still positive 
residual shadow costs. More generally, the appropriate measure is the sum of any noise created 
reduction in the market value of the housing stock plus residual  shadow costs. 
 
The remainder of this paper develops this idea and applies it to estimating the cost of the noise created 
by Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam.  Once obtained, the new measure can be used in standard fashion 
in decisions on whether to extend runways, reduce the number of flights and, if compensation is to be 
paid, how much it should be. The novelty in the paper lies in the methodology of measurement. 
   4
A political point on which we do not express an opinion is whether such residual costs should 
be compensated and if the answer is in the affirmative, whether this should have to be done 
by the government, the airport or the airline companies. A special complication is that 
inhabitants in the area may be heterogeneous with respect to their noise sensitivity. In that 
case we may expect that the noise-insensitive individuals will move to the noise-exposed 
houses (mostly near the airport), attracted by the lower prices those houses will bear. This 
heterogeneity depends on psychological characteristics, which we were unable to observe and 
which we will henceforth ignore. However, as we will argue later on, it is unlikely that this 
phenomenon plays an important role in the Amsterdam area.  
Actually, the noise problem around airports is a special case of the more general problem of how to 
deal with the difference between private and social costs. Pigou (1920) and Coase (1960) are the 
pioneers of this subject. There is a considerable empirical literature on this type of problems in general 
and for aircraft noise in particular. These studies use either revealed preference methods (e.g., the 
hedonic price method), or direct stated preference methods (e.g., the contingent valuation method, 
willingness to pay). Our method is based on market information and on subjective questions. 
Respondents are asked how they evaluate their ‘quality of life’ on a (1-10) scale. Such questions are 
standard instruments in sociological and psychological research. We use a question, which was 
originally developed by Cantril (1965). It appears that the answers depend on income, exposure to 
aircraft noise and many other variables.  
In Section 2, we give a short critical survey of the literature. In Section 3, we consider the data. In 
Section 4, we discuss some theoretical aspects of the model used. In Section 5, we formulate and 
estimate the empirical model for the Schiphol area. In Section 6, we derive the monetary shadow costs 
and the resulting compensations, which follow from the model, and their policy implications. In 
Section 7, we discuss the model and evaluate the relevance of this study for economic science and 
policy. In the Appendix, we consider the hedonic relationship between noise and house prices. 
                                                           
2 See e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1994; Pradhan and Ravallion, 2000; Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Van Praag, 1971; Van 
Praag and Frijters, 1999; Plug et al., 1999; Ferrer- i –Carbonell and Van Praag, 2001; Easterlin, 2001; Van 
Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2002, Van Praag and Ferrer- i –Carbonell, 2004. 
   5
 
2.  Short survey of the literature 
 
On the basis of our knowledge of the literature, the valuation of aircraft noise has mainly been 
approached along two roads. The first approach is that of hedonic price studies. The second employs 
the contingent valuation method (CVM). 
 
2.1 Hedonic price studies 
 
Attempts to value people’s preferences for peace and quiet have centred on the use of the hedonic 
price method. This method tries to impute a price for an environmental good by examining the effect 
that its presence has on the value of a relevant market-priced good, such as houses. In the case of 
aircraft noise nuisance, the method attempts to identify how much of the difference in housing prices 
is due to the level of noise nuisance. Table 1 shows the results of various recent hedonic price surveys 
that have studied the effect of aircraft noise on residential property values. In most studies, the price 
sensitivity with respect to aircraft noise is evaluated by the Noise Depreciation Index (NDI), which 
measures the change in property prices in terms of a percentage for each unit of change in the noise 
level. The NDI is derived on the basis of a survey of the changes in property values over particular 
periods or geographical areas (Nelson, 1980, pp. 40-42). A hedonic price equation is specified with the 
property value (V), on the one hand, and a set of physical and locational housing characteristics (Z) 
and the level of noise nuisance (N) on the other: V = V(Z,N). The measures of noise nuisance levels N 
differ between countries. For instance, the US noise descriptor is the Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF), 
the UK noise descriptor is the noise and number index (NNI), whereas the Dutch noise descriptor is 
the Kosten-unit (Ku)
 3. The NDI is derived from ∂V/∂N. An older list of results has been collected by 
Walters(1975).  Those results are similar to those of more the recent studies presented in Table 1. 
The consensus view that seems to have emerged from the hedonic price studies is that aircraft noise 
has a negative and statistically significant effect on housing prices, i.e. the NDI is around 0.6% on 
average (Collins and Evans, 1994, p. 175; Nelson, 1980, p. 46). This means that a dwelling of, say, 
$200,000 would sell for 12% less, that is $176,000, if located in a zone with 20 units more noise 
nuisance. 
                                                           
3 A few years ago, the US measure (NEF) was replaced by the Lden measure, and the UK measure (NNI) has 
been replaced by that of the Leq. The Dutch Kosten-measure, on which the present study is based, has recently 
been replaced by the Lden  measure as well. The Kosten-measure is a formula based on the noise level, the 
frequency and a penalty factor for flying during the evening or during the night. It is based on a consensus 
between members of a state commission consisting of engineers, psychophysicists and civil servants. The 
formula is very similar to the Noise Number Index for the U.K., as described in the report of the Wilson-
committee (1963) and the later NEF-index. There is a strong positive correlation between the Kosten-index and 
the Lden measure. Walters describes such national noise indexes for the U.K., the U.S.A., France and West 
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Table 1:  A summary of hedonic price studies and aircraft noise nuisance, measured in NDI (%) 
 

















































*  Noise nuisance is measured in NEF. 
**  Noise nuisance is measured in NNI. 
Sources: Nelson (1980, p.47-51); Pearce (1993, p. 72); Schipper (1997, p. 6). 
 
Looking at table 1, which summarizes 20 studies, it is obvious that there is a considerable variation. 
This is partly caused by differences in the measurement method used and the choice of the specific 
location. However, the use of the hedonic price method has at least two drawbacks. 
Firstly, using property price changes to elicit preferences for reducing noise nuisance does not 
encompass all the benefits of noise reduction. For instance, noise nuisance could entail health effects, 
and it is unlikely that individuals will be sufficiently aware of health risks to include those risks when 
choosing a dwelling at a certain location. Secondly, hedonic pricing is dependent on some rather strict 
assumptions which are in all probability not realistic for the Amsterdam area. The two most important 
assumptions have been explicitly formulated by Bateman (1993, p. 235): 
1.  The study area can be treated as a competitive market with freedom of access across the market and 
perfect information regarding housing prices and environmental characteristics. 
2.  The housing market in the study area is in equilibrium: individuals continually re-evaluate their 
location, and adjust their residential choice to changing circumstances. 
We come back to this point below in section 4. It would also seem therefore that the hedonic approach 
(see Blomquist et al. (1988)) is  not applicable to our problem. There is one recent study by Morrell 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Germany. It is remarkable how similar the formulas are, with the exception that they differ with respect to the 
exogenously fixed values of the parameters. 
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and Lu (2000), who estimate the loss in housing value in the Schiphol area. This study is not based on 
an  specific estimate for Schiphol but on an exogenously set NDI value of 0.40 %.  
 
2.2 Contingent valuation studies 
 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) uses surveys to find the willingness to pay (WTP) or the 
willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for a change in the level of environmental service flows. 
Only one CVM-study on aircraft noise nuisance is reviewed below, since we could only find this one 
study in the literature. 
There is a lively discussion on CVM in the literature (i.e. Pearce, 1993; Hausman, 1993). For a recent 
defence of CVM, we refer to Carson, Flores and Meade (2000). One of the problems of this approach 
is related to the direct way of questioning in CVM-questionnaires, which may entail a strategic-
response bias. For example, respondents are asked how much they are willing to pay for a reduction of 
noise nuisance during the night (WTP). This kind of questioning has an important drawback: strategic 
response behavior. Although we do not deny that CVM-analysis is informative, in the case of 
Schiphol, considered in this study, it would not have been very wise to use the CVM-like way of 
questioning. Schiphol Airport and noise nuisance are hot issues in the Netherlands and they constitute a 
playing–field for environmental activists. Had it been known that a survey was being carried out with the 
aim of establishing monetary compensation schemes for noise nuisance, it would definitely have led to 
strategic behavior (e.g., overestimation and/or a boycott of the survey). Respondents are not punished in 
any way if they do not express their true value but a value that is lower or higher than what they really 
feel in an attempt to influence the provision or price of the environmental good under valuation. 
Hence, we cannot always take the CVM-answer at face value.  
The CVM has the advantage that it measures user values and non-user values. A non-user value may 
be assigned to the existence of natural reserves, which are threatened to become less 'natural' when 
situated next to a runway. Non-user values cannot be measured by means of the hedonic price method. 
For instance, noise nuisance has no price effect in areas without houses, since in these ‘empty’ areas 
no housing prices exist that may reflect the impact of noise, but (non-)user values may be assigned to 
these non-housing areas.  Environmentalists stress that air traffic may cause the living conditions of 
animals in nature reserves and bird sanctuaries to deteriorate. 
One CVM study on aircraft noise was conducted in Israel by Feitelson et al. (1996). It estimated the 
effect of changes in aircraft noise exposure, following an airport expansion, on the WTP for 
residences. Home owners in three communities near a major airport, where a significant expansion 
was planned, were asked to state their WTP for a four-bedroom single family residence located in an 
area with no aircraft noise at all. Next, they were asked to state their WTP for the same residence if it 
is located at sites subject to different levels of noise (expressed in Lden- units). A similar sequence of 
WTP questions was conducted for tenants in terms of monthly rent for a three-bedroom residence. 
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This Israeli study suggests that the difference in valuation for residences with no noise nuisance compared 
with residences with frequent and severe noise nuisance is 2.4 - 4.1% of the housing prices per Lden (for 
home owners) and 1.8 - 3.0% of the rents per Lden (for tenants). These noise depreciation indices (NDI) are 
higher than the values obtained in most hedonic price studies (around 0.6% on average). This may be 
partly due to the fact that CVM estimates include the loss of non-use values, whereas the hedonic price 
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estimates only identify market premiums. Feitelson et al. also suggest another explanation, viz. the fact 
that the WTP structures are kinked. This implies that, beyond a certain disturbance threshold, households 
are unwilling to pay anything for the affected residences. Hence, their valuation of (the reduction of) noise 
nuisance is so high, because they are not willing to pay anything for a residence in a noisy location. 
 
3. The  data 
 
In recent decades the aircraft noise generated by the Amsterdam Airport Schiphol has been closely 
monitored per zip code. Noise is evaluated in Kosten units (Ku) named after a government 
commission, chaired by the late professor Kosten. In 1967 the Kosten Commission derived a formula, 
based on the noise in decibels, the frequency of the flights, and a correcting factor for day- and  night-
traffic. As already said before, this Kosten-measure is comparable with the recently introduced Lden –
measure. Maximum annual noise norms are given for each zip-code area but, during the last fifteen 
years with steadily growing air traffic, it has been increasingly difficult to stay within these noise-
limits. The public authorities have sometimes threatened the airport with the closure of some specific 
runways after November in a particular year, as the accumulated annual noise burden for specific zip 
codes would then exceed the annual amount permitted, but in fact such threats have never been 
implemented, being too detrimental to the economic existence of the airport. Since it is impossible to 
locate the airport elsewhere, and it is equally impossible to relocate the inhabitants, Dutch political 
opinion is now tending to the solution of monetary compensation to the inhabitants, who get a noise 
overdose. The primary question in this paper is whether there is reason to compensate inhabitants and, 
if so, by what amount. The same information is needed in order to evaluate decisions as to whether a 
new runway should be built. In the context of a cost-benefit analysis we would have to evaluate the 
predicted noise damage for inhabitants in terms of money in comparison to the advantages, generated 
by the new runway. 
In 1998 we designed a postal survey
5 under the population, living within a radius of 50 kilometers 
around the Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. The area is called the Amsterdam Area. Some of the 
respondents suffer from serious aircraft noise, while others in the same area are not subject to such 
noise at all. It depends on the specific rather narrow flight paths along which airplanes are scheduled 
to arrive at and to leave from Schiphol. The area consists of the city of Amsterdam and some twenty 
other municipalities; some are strongly urbanized and others rural. The aircraft noise in this area is 
closely monitored. Outside the monitored 50 km radius, the noise nuisance is negligible. 
                                                           
4 The manner of questioning in the Feitelson et al. study differs from the traditional CVM question in the sense 
that noise nuisance is not valued directly. Instead, it is valued indirectly, as the WTP is stated for a different 
good (viz., residences, a marketed good) of which noise nuisance is but one attribute. 
5 This research was commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Traffic and Transport and carried out by 
Amsterdam Economics (SEO) and Intomart, Hilversum. 
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Asking people for their opinion on noise nuisance in an area where there is a public outcry with 
respect to this issue calls for specific precautions. Explicit questioning, as in a CVM-study, is –as we 
stated earlier– risky, as it would lead to strategic response behaviour and probably a sample selection 
bias with a heavy over-representation of people with strong views on noise. In order to avoid such 
problems, we embedded our relevant questions in an elaborate mail questionnaire, which did not focus 
on aircraft noise, but which dealt with the broad area of ‘health, well-being and living situations in the 
Netherlands’. A second objective was to get some idea of the relative importance of a list of nuisance 
factors. The questionnaire, which consisted of 51 question modules, was sent by mail to a random 
sample of households in the area.  
When designing the data collection method, one can choose from various modes. At one extreme, we 
have the ‘intensive’ mode, with reminders in writing, phone calls, and incentives in the form of gifts of 
money or in kind. If we do all this, it is obvious to the interviewee that there is no anonymity between 
him and the data collection agency. This may generate a selection bias if we have a sensitive 
questionnaire on individual well-being. The most ‘extensive’ way is to send off the questionnaire, and 
simply wait for the anonymous response. We decided on a compromise, where we sent out only one 
reminder. The reminder was sent out to all addressees, because, as a consequence of the strictly kept 
anonymity, we were unable to identify the addressees who had already responded. It is evident that the 
response rate depends on the collection method. As a result of the rather extensive collection method  
our response rate was rather low at 17 %, but the sample was representative for the population when 
compared with the distributions of some characteristics, which are known for the population. The net 
sample, which is used for this study, consists of 1,400 respondents. Given the fact that this study was a 
pilot project, it was decided that the sample of 1,400 observations in the Schiphol area was sufficiently 
large for a first analysis and an evaluation of the method.  
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One of the crucial tools of analysis is the well-being question, originally devised by Cantril (1965) and 
since then used in hundreds of sociological and psychological surveys all over the world. It asks for an 
evaluation of general well-being or 'quality of life' (QOL). It runs as follows: 
  
Figure 1: The Cantril ladder-of-life question 
 
Here is a picture of a ladder, representing the ladder of life. Suppose we say that the top of 
the ladder (step 10) represents the best possible life for you, and the bottom (step 1) 
represents the worst possible life for you. 
Where on the ladder do you feel that you personally stand at the present time? 
(Please put a cross in one box only) 
Best conceivable  10           2.9% 
 9             9.1% 
 8           34.5% 
 7           29.9% 
 6           10.9% 
 5             4.6% 
 4             2.2% 
 3             1.0% 
 2             0.5% 
Worst conceivable  1            0.4% 
No answer           3.9% 
 
 
The marginal response distribution is given in the second column (N =1,400). We note that only 3.9% 
of the respondents are unable or do not want to answer the question. Moreover, we see that all 
categories are filled in, with a majority choosing categories 7 and 8. Only about 10% of the 
respondents rate life quality as 5 or lower. 
We shall explain the answer on the quality-of-life question by some other variables including   
constructed variable 'perceived aircraft noise frequency'. Among the 51 question modules, Question 25 
is particularly relevant for our study. Question 25 is shown in Table 2. 
By asking for nine possible sources of noise, aircraft noise is not singled out for special attention. The 
response rates for the questions are shown in Table 2. The category 'no answer' includes the category 
'non-relevant'.  
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Apart from those subjective questions, we asked for information concerning a host of other, mostly 
factual, variables, such as household incomes, age, family composition, education, a typology of the 
dwelling, including owner or non-ownership. It was also asked whether the dwelling was insulated. 
More precisely, there was asked about three types of insulation: thermal insulation, noise insulation, 
and draught proofing. Finally, we had the zip code for each respondent at the finest level. In the 
Netherlands, there are on average 12 households with the same zip code, although there is a 
considerable variation about that average. Given the zip code, we could make a link with the list in 
which the objective aircraft noise levels in Ku are described per zip code.  
In sum, the special bits of information that we shall use in the remainder of this paper are those 
derived from the question 25.4 on noise nuisance and the question on general well-being, some 
demographic characteristics, and information on housing. The information is completed with the 
objective noise burden in Ku per zip code. 
 
Table 2: Q.25. Would you please indicate the frequency at which the following sound sources cause 
noise nuisance at the place where you live ? 
Sound sources   Never  Sometimes  Regularly  Often  Always  No answer 
1.  Cars, buses, mopeds, 
trucks 




6.  Hotels, restaurants, pubs 
and other places of 
entertainment 
7.  Noise nuisance from 
neighbors 
8. Children/youngsters 















    40.3% 
      6.1% 
      9.1% 
    32.9% 
      9.0% 
    10.6% 
 
 
     
    32.1% 
    29.8% 
      3.2% 
 
 13.5% 
   1.9% 
   2.1% 
 18.6% 
   2.0% 




   7.1% 
   5.3% 















  7.1% 
  2.1% 
  1.8% 
 13.2% 
   0.4% 








  11.6% 
  19.5% 
  19.6% 
    5.1% 
  20.4% 




    16.4% 
  18.4% 
  52.0% 
*  N =1,400 for respondents in the Schiphol area. 
 
4. The  model 
 
It is not that easy to find the impact of external effects. Although the theory holds for all types of 
effects, we shall cast our analysis in terms of air traffic noise in order to make the discussion 
somewhat less abstract. We assume that any location is subject to a specific noise level z . We call 
z the value of the externality. If z = 0, we have the situation of ‘no noise’. We assume that the 
0 ≥
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individual has an indirect utility function Wy . We shall assume that this utility function is 
ordinally observable, and that the utilities are interpersonally comparable. That is, if two individuals A 
and B feel equally satisfied,  W  holds. In terms of the Cantril-question, it implies that an 
evaluation of '7' corresponds to the same subjectively perceived level of satisfaction for A and B. 
Evidently, interpersonal comparability can not be proven or refuted; it is a primitive assumption, 
without which we would be unable to analyse this type of subjective questions. However, the fact that 
such questions are regularly asked in surveys, covering large and heterogeneous samples, 
demonstrates that professional survey designers assume that the responses on such questions are 




(, Wyp ) ;) (, z z Wy =
(,() ; pz z
 
B
Two situations can be distinguished: the situation of equilibrium, and the situation of disequilibrium
6. 




In equilibrium, we assume that the individual can move freely and without transaction costs from one 
location to another. In general, we may assume that the price vector depends on the external factor, in 
this case noise z, say  ( p pz = . For instance, houses subject to a lot of noise will be lower priced than 
identical houses without noise. If prices depend on the external factor, we say that the externality is 
partly or completely reflected in the price differentials
7, in a way to be made precise hereafter.  In a 
situation of equilibrium, utility differences between earners of the same income cannot exist; hence the 
equilibrium condition is  
 
  ( ( 0 ) ; 0 ) p  (4.1) 
where y stands for income and p for a price vector. In the case where two individuals have identical 
houses, except for the noise burden z, we may interpret the price differential  (0) ( ) hh p pz −  
forhousing as the monetary counter-value of the noise burden z. This is actually the method used in 
hedonic price analysis, where the effects of z on prices of identical dwellings but at different locations 
are compared. If we are able to observe the indirect utility function, then we may test whether 
equilibrium holds. We observe Wy ) (;) Wyz = , and likewise we observe 
. Our test for equilibrium is whether Wy ( , (0);0) ( ;0) Wyp Wy = (;) (; 0 ) z Wy = . We do not even 
                                                          
6 By its nature, a disequilibrium is always temporary if economic subjects are free to move. However, it may 
take a long time (some years) to restore equilibrium adapted to the new value of the externality. If, in the 
meantime, the value of the externality is changed again and again, a final equilibrium is not reached. 
7 In a similar way, it may be that income y depends on z, say y = y(z). In the case of the Amsterdam area, this is 
inconceivable, but it is realistic if we think about salaries in Florida compared with those in Alaska, or about the 
income differences needed to attract workers from unpolluted areas to industrial or mining regions. We shall 
assume, for the Amsterdam area, that incomes do not depend on air traffic noise. 
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have to know the hedonic price relationship  ( ) p z
(;) z
. Our empirical instrument will be the Cantril-
ladder-question in Fig.1. If we observe Wy (; 0 ) Wy = , there is equilibrium; if we observe 
, there is no equilibrium. If Wy (;) (; 0 ) Wyz Wy ≠ (,() pz ;) (,( 0 ) ; 0 ) z Wyp = , we say that the 
externality is (completely) reflected in the price differential. If price differences neutralize the 
differences in z, the value of the damage, which is caused by the externality, is known and can be 
compensated to the original inhabitants, while the movers-in  pay a new lower noise-reflecting price. 
The difference between an externality and the natural environment (e.g. mountains, climate, draught) 
is that in the former case the externality can be changed at will by the owner or the authority in control 
of  the externality, while the natural environment cannot be changed at will. In the airport situation, it 
might be stopping the flights, after which the house prices would eventually recover to their original 
level.  
 
4.2 Dis-equilibrium, the case of Amsterdam. 
 
In our neo-classical world, the basic assumption is that equilibrium prevails; price differentials 
compensate for differences in noise exposure. Above, we made it clear that this assumption may be 
empirically tested by means of the Cantril-question. Hence, we no longer assume neo-classical 
equilibrium for granted, but we will test whether it prevails. Our hunch is that, for long-term 
investments in consumer goods, the equilibrium situation is not very probable. For instance, I buy a 
house for € 200,000 when I am 25. At 50 I am still living in the same house, although my income has 
doubled, my children have left home, housing prices have quadrupled and since 15 years there has 
been  a runway nearby. It is not very likely that I would choose this house again, if I were now in the 
position to buy a new house. However, as the monetary cost of moving out is relatively large, housing 
prices have soared during the last 25 years and the psychic cost of leaving my neighbourhood and my 
neighbours is considerable, I prefer to stay in my house, even though in my present situation I would 
not have chosen to buy it again. Equilibrium, in the sense that marginal utilities are proportional to 
prices according to Gossen's Second Law, is probable for non-durables but not for durables, where 
switching is difficult and costly. 
 
Let us now look in more detail at the subject of our paper, since most readers will not be familiar with 
the Amsterdam circumstances. The Amsterdam, or even the Dutch housing market as a whole, can 
definitely not be characterized as being in equilibrium. This statement will sound commonplace to 
most Dutch people, but it requires some explanation for an international readership. First, we should 
know that the respondents in the sample to be analysed below have lived in their present dwelling in 
the Greater Amsterdam Area on average for about 13 years. We note that this is actually an 
underestimate of the total duration, because we observe unfinished spells. It is doubtful whether most 
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owners and tenants would have chosen today the same housing, which they chose 20 years ago. They 
stay where they are, given the considerable monetary and non-monetary switching costs. Apart from 
this general reason for being sceptical about an equilibrium, there are special reasons to believe that 
the Amsterdam Area is not in equilibrium. The Dutch housing situation in general, and in the 
Amsterdam area in particular, may be considered as being in a situation of significant disequilibrium, 
at least since 1945 at the end of World War II. At that time, there was a tremendous housing shortage, 
triggered by war damage, the backlog of marriages after the war, changes in the minimum quality 
standards for housing, and the baby-boom. The Dutch government tried to solve the problem by a 
strict regulation policy, which has changed several times in the period since 1945, but which in fact is 
still mostly in force. It is probably this regulation policy, geared to decent housing for all, which has 
blocked the Dutch market mechanism up to the present day. 
The main ingredients of this policy were, and are, the following. First, the building of all new houses 
and apartments is subject to permission by the local and national authorities. Hence, the number, the 
size, the price of new houses or rents of rented units to be built is planned; during this more than 50 
year period, to put it mildly, the link between demand and supply was weak. Second, the stock is split 
up into 'social housing' and a 'free sector' with a heavy accent on social housing. In the Amsterdam 
area, the social housing sector, consisting of rented houses and apartments, is about 70% of the market 
and it is only accessible for households below a certain income. The fraction of houses that is owned 
by its inhabitant is in the order of 10% in Amsterdam. In the suburbs that fraction varies between 10% 
and 50%. In the 'social' sector there reigns a severe policy of rationing, resulting in a waiting time of 
about 8.5 years in 2002. Third, a permanent rent control in both the social and the free sector prevails, 
where existing rents are increased annually by a certain percentage, which is set by Parliament, mostly 
in tune with general inflation. Finally, rent contracts in both the private and in the social sector are 
more or less permanent; the owner of the house has no right to break  the contract, even if the owner 
wants to sell the house empty. In most cases, even heirs who live in the house as housemates of the 
deceased tenant, have an automatic right to continue the tenancy agreement. In the social sector, this 
leads to the situation that tenants who no longer qualify for entrance because their income has grown 
far above the limit for such housing can still keep on living in their subsidized house. As a 
consequence, a sizeable fraction of the social sector is occupied by households that would not qualify 
for a new tenancy agreement. Only in very special cases is it possible to break  the contractual relation 
by a Court decision. In contrast, the tenant can terminate the relation at any time. The reader will not 
be surprised, that in those conditions, we do not find the equilibrium assumption appropriate. Actually, 
the greater part of the market is subjected to a rationing regime. This does not, however, exclude the 
fact that some individuals will be in an equilibrium situation at given prices. 
Although in this paper we consider the Amsterdam market in particular, we suspect that many housing 
markets, e.g. in London or Paris, are also not in equilibrium when closely investigated and that similar 
observations may hold for other markets, such as that for health care insurance where the privately 
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insured elderly virtually have no opportunity to change insurance. Hence, we do not think that the case 
dealt with here is a unique case of a persistent dis-equilibrium, but rather one example of a frequently 
encountered situation. 
 
4.3. Disequilibrium, the theory. 
 
We assume that income and commodity prices (except possibly those for housing and rents) have 
nothing to do with air traffic noise. We write  (, h) p pp − = , where  h p stands for the house price and 
we assume
8 that  () hh p pz = . It follows that utility may be written as Wy .  () (, , ;) (,) h p p z z Wyz − =
We assume W (.) to be continuously differentiable in both variables y  and  z. There are two 
possibilities. The first is the equilibrium situation as explained before, where 
. The noise effect is completely reflected in the house 
price. We may rewrite the equality as Wy
() () (, , ;) (, , 0; 0 ) h Wyp p z z Wyp p −− = h
(;) (; 0 ) z Wy = . Individuals with the same income enjoy 
equal utility at either location.  
The second situation, which we assume to be the usual situation in the Amsterdam area, yields 
 or, in short, Wy () () (, , ;) (, , 0; 0 ) hh Wyp p z z Wyp p −− ≠ (;) (; 0 ) z Wy ≠ . In that case, there may be 
some difference between  and  () 0 h p ( ) h p z , but not enough to achieve equality. As a rule, we will 
have 
    (4.2)  ( , , (0); ) ( , , ( ); ) ( , , (0);0) hh Wyp p z Wyp p z z Wyp p −−− ≤≤ h
 
There is an additional income compensation ∆y needed to achieve utility equality between both 
locations. The income compensation is found by solving the equation 
  ( ) ( ) (y  , , ; ) ( , , 0 ; h W y ppzz W y pp −− +∆ = 0 ) h  (4.3) 
 
The money amount ∆y is the residual shadow cost that we are looking for. It is this amount that 
should be compensated for, if authorities decide to compensate. We notice that ∆y will, in general, 
depend on the income level. The compensation ∆y may also depend on the utility level. We stress that 
the shadow cost ∆y will be zero, if the noise effect is completely reflected in prices.  If the noise effect 
is not completely reflected, the compensation ∆y will be a residual compensation. If   (0) ( ) hh p pz = , 
                                                           
8 We notice that houses differ in many respects in reality. For ease of explanation, we assume here that all 
houses are identical except for differences in their noise burden. 
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the compensation will have to be total, as prices do not differentiate with respect to z. We define the 
total shadow cost of noise z as  
  Shadow cost of noise z  ( ) ( ) (0 )y hh pp z  = −+ ∆  (4.4) 
 
This is the sum of the hedonic price differential and the residual income compensation. 
If W depends on other variables, such as the age (age) of the individual, or his family size (fs), it 
follows that, generally speaking, the compensation according to (4.2) may depend on those other 
variables as well. Whether such variables are taken into account as a basis for compensation is a 
question of politics, the administration costs, and the negotiation power of the action group 
representing the interests of inhabitants and other parties, e.g. the airport authority and 
environmentalists. 
A final point is that individuals may vary in noise-sensitivity. Walters(1975) distinguished between 
'perturbable’ and ‘imperturbable' individuals. ‘Imperturbables’ are immune with respect to aircraft 
noise. It is obvious that in this case the imperturbables prefer to live at the edge of the airport or below 
a flight path, because this would give them a premium of  (0) ( ) hh p pz − . This would yield the 
pathological effect that life satisfaction would increase instead of decrease with noise exposure. In the 
econometric estimates in the next section we find that noise has a negative effect on life satisfaction, 
which implies that noise heterogeneity coupled with the choice of noise-exposed housing cannot be a 
regular phenomenon around Amsterdam. We can only state that a refined theory on individualized 
shadow costs would come out with shadow costs, which vary with the individual's noise aversion, and 
a price system, which becomes more or less noise-sensitive as the proportion of 'perturbability' in the 
population rises or falls. Without a specified demand and supply model it is impossible to draw more 
specific conclusions. For practical purposes and political relevance it seems preferable to assume a 
homogeneous population consisting of average individuals. This is also in line with the idea that 
‘citizens are equal before the law’ and, consequently, official policy cannot, and should not, take into 
account psychological differences between citizens for differentiating with respect to compensation. 
Assuming that we have an empirically operational index of ordinal well-being, by means of which we 
can observe well-being per individual household, this would provide us with a test instrument for the 
hypothesis that price differentials fully compensate for noise exposure differentials. If W (y; z) is 
constant in z, it implies  that price differentials compensate the noise differentials, including the case 
that individuals are noise-insensitive in which case no compensation is needed. If W (y; z) is not 
constant in z, it implies that the noise effect is not fully compensated by price differentials. In that 
case, we may calculate the additional monetary compensation needed to neutralize noise differences. 
Most economists are skeptical about the measurability and interpersonal comparability of well-being. 
In our sister disciplines of psychology and sociology, but also in health economics, this skepticism is 
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not shared. Actually, the previous analysis in terms of a W-function does not lead to anything, if we 
do not define an empirical analogue. We use the Cantril ladder-of-life question as shown in Figure 1. 
This question module (or a modification of it as a horizontal scale) is since 1965 included as a matter 
of routine in many sociological and psychological surveys all over the world
9. The question is quite 




The usual way to analyse a categorical question like the Cantril-question is by means of Ordered 
Logit- or Ordered Probit-Analysis. We assume a latent continuous variable W, which we observe 
through a classification procedure with ordered categories 1,…,10. The latent variable may be 
explained by some observable objective variables. We selected the following explanatory variables: 
 
•  net monthly household income (lny) 
•  family size (lnfs and (lnfs)
2) 
•  interaction term of income and family size (lny * lnfs) 
•  age of the respondent (lnage and (lnage)
2) 
•  noise in terms of Kosten units (lnKu)
  
                                                          
•  interaction term of a dummy for noise insulation (Ins) and noise, in terms of Ku (Ins*lnKu). 
 
Although the Cantril-question has already been used in many economic studies
10, In those studies a 
noise effect was never included, quite probably because the data sets used did not contain such 
variables. Using the variables listed above, we start by explaining the Cantril measure of well-being W 
by the equation: 
 
W  = β0 + β1lny + β2lnfs + β3(lnfs)
2 + β4lny*lnfs + β5lnage 
 + β6(lnage)
2 + β7lnKu + β8Ins*lnKu  (5.1) 
 
The effect of income is, of course, expected to be positive. As we do not have clear expectations on 
the family size effect, and there may be an optimum number of children, we introduce a squared term 
in ln(fs). We also add an interaction term between ‘ln(y)’ and ‘ln(fs)’, since we assume that the 
optimum number of children depends on the financial situation of the household. 
 
 
9 For example, during the period 1996-2000 in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). It has recently been 
re-introduced. 
10 For instance, Clark and Oswald (1994), Plug and Van Praag (1995), Van Praag and Plug (1998), 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2000). 
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Furthermore, it seems safe to assume that well-being is age-dependent. As we do not know the 
relationship, we choose a flexible form by adding a log-quadratic form. We choose the logarithm of 
age instead of age, although age is used in much of the literature (Mincer, 1963). In our view,  ln(age) 
is more reasonable, as the years seemed to go faster, as one grows older. 
 
Next, two variables describing the respondent's living situation are included in the model, viz. the 
level of aircraft noise nuisance in Ku, and the presence of noise insulation. Obviously, the effect of 
aircraft noise nuisance on well-being is expected to be negative. The interaction term Ins*lnKu is 
included in the model, since we assume that the size of the negative noise effect will do less harm if 
the house has noise insulation (Ins=1) and, hence, that well-being will be positively affected by the 
presence of noise insulation. The resulting Ordered Probit-estimates for this equation (leaving out the 
nine threshold values) are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Estimation of the well-being equation with the variable Ku 
  First equation  First equation extended with other variables 











           0.5093# 
         - 2.3941# 
         - 0.1613 
           0.3274# 
         - 4.2372# 
           0.5681# 
         - 0.0242 









         0.5107# 
       - 1.8870# 
       - 0.1787 
         0.2582# 
       - 3.7262# 
         0.4896# 
       - 0.0213 













             0.0443 
         0.0375 
       - 0.0633 





  N = 1,067           Pseudo R
2 = 0.1614  N = 1,067           Pseudo R
2 = 0.1654 
# Significantly different from 0 at a 5% level. The number of observations is less than 1,400 due to missings. 
(The maximum in age is reached at the age of 42) 
 
Looking at the results in the second and third columns of Table 3, we see that the effect of noise 
nuisance is not significant. It follows that our first attempt to identify the externality effect has not 
been rewarded. We may think that additional variables might improve things. We added the following 
variables: 
 
•  monthly housing expenses (lnHe) 
•  dummy for presence at home during the day (Home) 
•  dummy for presence of balcony (Bal) 
•  dummy for presence of garden (Gar) 
 
As we see from the last two columns in Table 3, the results do not improve at all. Consequently, we 
might decide that the noise effect is compensated by prices. However, there is still another possibility. 
It may be that the objective Ku-measure does not adequately describe subjectively perceived noise 
nuisance and the latter is, after all, the relevant variable. The index Ku is a measure that does not 
include non-acoustic factors. Actually, it is quite possible that different individuals perceive the same 
level of noise differently. For instance, if an individual is at home during the daytime, it stands to 
reason that noise will have a greater impact than if he or she works outside the home during the day. 
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The same holds for family size. The larger the family, the higher is the family exposure to external 
factors. In short, the crucial information is not the objective measurement of noise, but the subjective 
perception of it. The concept, which explains subjective well-being, is the subjective variable 
perceived noise, which we shall call noise for short. As a matter of fact the Ku- measure and 
comparable measures, such as those used in the U.K. and elsewhere, have been constructed to reflect 
the subjective perception of noise by using log-transformations and a trade-off between the number of 
flights and the loudness of the noise per flight. But such measures are not corrected for individual 
characteristics. Given the objective for which they have been constructed, this is not meant as an 
objection. The method of measurement of noise nuisance, caused by an airport or a plane, cannot be 
made dependent on the specific inhabitants who dwell underneath the flight path.  
Fortunately, in the survey, a question was also asked about the respondent's subjective noise 
perception. We define the aircraft noise nuisance by means of Question 25.4 in the dataset (see Table 
2). Subjectively perceived noise is measured by subjective evaluations on a discrete [1-5] scale. We 
assume that the latent variable noise may be explained by the equation: 
 
 Noise  =  α1lnfs + α2lnHe + α3Home + α4Bal+ α5Gar + α6lnKu + α0 + η  (5.2) 
 
where η stands for the N(0,1)-distributed error term. We observe that five of the six variables in this 
specification are 'individual'. The resulting Ordered Probit estimates for this equation are shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Estimation of the intermediate variable ‘noise’ 







  0.1578# 
  0.1457# 
  0.2120# 
0.0458 
  0.2718# 







         N = 1,281               Pseudo R
2 = 0.2251 
# Significantly different from zero at a 5% level. 
 
The influence of family size on noise is positive: the larger the household, the more annoyance is 
perceived. Furthermore, the results indicate that the higher the housing expenses, the more aircraft 
noise nuisance is perceived as annoying. Obviously, if the dwelling is more expensive, one expects 
better housing quality, and absence of noise nuisance is one of the relevant quality dimensions. It may 
also be that richer people are more sensitive to the negative factors that influence their living quality. 
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In addition, individuals (e.g. housewives) who are at home (Home = 1) during the day on weekdays 
experience more aircraft noise nuisance than people who are away from the home in the daytime. 
The next two variables describe noise-relevant aspects of the respondents’ living situation, viz. the 
presence of a balcony, and the presence of a garden. The dummy variable Bal is 1 if a balcony is 
present, and 0 otherwise. The same applies to the dummy variable Gar for garden. It appears that the 
presence of a garden significantly increases the extent to which individuals are annoyed by aircraft 
noise. The effect of the presence of a balcony is also positive, but not significant, at a 5% level. 
Finally, we include the core variable: the level of aircraft noise nuisance. Of course, the effect of 
aircraft noise nuisance on noise is strongly positive. Our conclusion is that perceived noise not only 
depends  on the objective noise level, but also is strongly 'colored' by intervening, non-acoustic 
variables. This is also the reason why Ku by itself did not have a significant effect (see Table 3) in the 
original equation (5.1).  
Respondents who are exposed to the same subjective noise level will be characterized by the same 
value of the latent variable noise. We may evaluate the expected noise level for each respondent by 
substituting his own values for the explanatory variables in eq. (4.5). We can even reach a finer 
approximation if we take account of the specific response category of Question 25 which the 
respondent has chosen. Then we may also assess the perceived noise by the conditional expectation of 
noise, given that the respondent has chosen a specific response category i (i= 1,…,5)  (for the explicit 
expression for this conditional expectation (see Maddala (1983); Terza (1987)). 
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The variable noise, which we operationalize by eq. (5.3), is an ordinal index of subjective noise 
nuisance. If we replace Ku in eq.(5.1) by the intermediate variable noise (specified in eq. (5.3)), the 
specification of the well-being equation reads as follows: 
 
 
W = β0 + β1lny + β2lnfs + β3(lnfs)
2 + β4lny*lnfs + β5lnage 
 + β6(lnage)
2 + β7noise + β8Ins*noise  (5.4) 
 
In this specification, we suppose that well-being is indirectly, and not directly, influenced by changes 
in the level of Ku, viz. via the intermediate variable noise. We replace the objective variable Ku by a 
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subjective translation of it. The perceived  noise nuisance depends on objective noise Ku and on 
individual characteristics. The resulting estimates for this equation are presented in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5: Estimation of the well-being equation with the intermediate variable noise 











    0.5039# 
  - 2.1450# 
- 0.1758 
    0.3061# 
  - 4.2718# 
    0.5788# 
  - 0.1126# 









                  N = 1,031                        Pseudo R
2 = 0.1662 
# Significantly different from zero at a 5% level.  
 
Let us begin by noting  that the coefficients in Tables 5 and 3 hardly differ, except for the noise coefficient. 
Net monthly income has a positive and significant impact on well-being. The family-size effects lnfs and 
(lnfs)
2 are negative, but the latter is not significant. The coefficient of the interaction term with income 
(lnfs*lny) is positive and significant. The age effect is quadratic with a minimum at 40 years. 
The variable noise now has a significant and negative influence on well-being. The positive and significant 
interaction term of noise insulation with noise nuisance (Ins*noise) indicates that, if the house is not  noise-
insulated, the effect of noise nuisance on well-being is -0.1126, whereas this effect reduces by almost two-
thirds to -0.0390 (-0.1126 + 0.0736) if the house does have noise insulation.
11.It should be noted that 
insulation and Ku-exposure are correlated. However, insulation is not purely endogenous, as Schiphol 
Airport has  the formal obligation to insulate all the houses in the most exposed residential quarters at no 
cost to the inhabitants. We see therefore that replacing the objective measure Ku by an ordinal subjective 
analogue was worthwhile.  
Since noise is positively related to the noise level in Ku, well-being is negatively related to the noise 
level in Ku. Using this specification of well-being, it is now possible to compute residual shadow costs 
for changes in the noise level in Ku. 
 
                                                           
11 This result: that insulation does not fully mitigate the effect of noise, was also found in the contingent valuation 
study conducted by Feitelson et al. (1996, p. 11), discussed in Section 2 above. In a study of the Dutch consulting 
agency Regioplan on the nature and extent of the complaints about aircraft noise nuisance in the Schiphol area, a 
similar incomplete effect of noise insulation was found (Hulshof and Noyon, 1997, p. 73). 
   24
6.  The resulting shadow costs 
 
6.1.  A compensation schedule differentiated with respect to net monthly income 
 
As seen above, the total shadow costs can be decomposed into a price component and a residual cost 
component. When prices are constant in z, that is, they do not reflect differences in noise exposure, the 
total cost will equal residual cost. Actually, it is found in the Appendix that prices in the Amsterdam area 
are not- significantly related to the Ku–burden, due to the disequilibrium in the housing market. It follows 
that residual costs are equal to total costs in the present context.  
We are now able to derive the residual shadow costs for changes in the noise level measured in Ku on the 
basis of Tables 4 and 5. Considering Tables 4 and 5 we may write schematically W = W (y, noise (Ku, x), 
z), where y stands for income, noise is the perceived noise nuisance (which is a function of the objective 
noise level in Ku and of other intervening variables x, including family size (fs) and age), and, finally, a 
vector z  of other variables. The compensation ∆y, needed to compensate for an increase  ∆Ku, is now 
calculated from the equation: 
 
W (y + ∆y, noise (Ku + ∆Ku, x), z) = W (y, noise (Ku, x), z) (6.1) 
 
Dropping all non-relevant terms, this boils down to the equation: 
 
(β1 + β4 lnfs) * (lny + ∆lny) + (β7 + β8Ins) * (noise(Ku + ∆Ku)) = 
(β1 + β4 lnfs) * lny + (β7 + β8Ins) * noise(Ku) 
or 
(β1 + β4 lnfs) * ∆lny = - (β7 + β8Ins) * 0.3445(∆lnKu)) (6.2) 
 
where β1, β4, β7, β8 are given in Table 5, and the coefficient 0.3445 is taken from Table 4. Equation (6.2) 
may be rewritten as: 
 
















The first point, which follows from (6.3), is that the residual shadow cost is not linear in Ku, but it depends 
on the level of Ku. The change from 20 Ku to 30 Ku is equivalent to the change from 30 Ku to 45 Ku. It is 
the relative change that counts. This is not surprising as nearly every psychophysical stimulus is translated 
on a logarithmic scale.  
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Similarly, the monetary compensation depends on the initial income level. Here, it is also found that it is 
the relative change that counts. The expression ∂lny/∂lnKu is an elasticity. Politically, this implies that the 
compensation for noise nuisance depends on income, where richer people are entitled to higher 
compensation in money terms. Politically, this is hard to defend but not impossible. It is actually the same 
mechanism which makes a progressive income tax acceptable. The pain of an income loss of €100 is 
smaller if one has an income of € 2,000 than if one earns an income of € 1,000. Similarly, a compensation 
of € 100 means less to somebody with € 2,000 than to an individual earning € 1,000. An alternative 
compensation scheme which  may be acceptable to politicians is a scheme that differentiates for housing 
expenses. Although housing expenses may be more neutral in a political sense, the results are found to be 
similar, since housing expenses and income are strongly and positively correlated. 
From equation (6.3) it appears that the compensation (elasticity) depends on whether or not the dwelling is 
noise-insulated. The compensation needed is much smaller if the dwelling is insulated (Ins = 1). 
 
Finally, the compensation depends on the family size. As this is not a politically relevant parameter, we fix 
the value of lnfs at the sample average of 0.6743. This results in two values for the elasticity (∂lny/∂lnKu), 
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The constant elasticities imply that there is a log-linear relationship between Ku and income y. That is, if 
Ku increases by a%, then the income y has to be increased by b% to hold well-being constant. The 
percentages b have been tabulated below, both for the case without and the case with noise insulation. 
 
Table 6:   Monetary compensation amounts as a fraction of net income for selected changes in 
noise level 
Noise level changes  20 → 30 Ku 30  → 40 Ku 40  → 50 Ku 
Without insulation  
With insulation 
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We see that at a monthly net income of € 1,500 a household would have to be compensated with 
2.24% of its income, that is € 33.6 per month, for a noise increase from 20 to 30 Ku.
12 A change from 
20 to 40 Ku would require compensation of € 33.6 + € 23.7 = € 57.3 per month, approximately. The 
compensation amounts needed for houses with insulation are much smaller, but still not equal to zero. For 
instance, at the same income level of € 1,500, the compensation would be only € 11.55 per month. This 
also implies that the monthly value of insulation at that level would be € 33.6 - € 11.55 = € 22.05. Under 
pressure of both public opinion and the government, the Schiphol Airport authorities have accepted the 
obligation to insulate dwellings which are in high Ku areas (> 45 Ku). Now the question arises: would it be 
cheaper to pay the compensation or to insulate the house? By subtracting the second row from the first row 
in Table 6, we find the value of the insulation. Clearly, noise insulation is a capital investment. Using an 
interest-rate of 5%, a monthly amount of € 22.05 is equivalent to a capital expenditure of 20*12*€ 22.05 = 
€ 5,292. It follows that authorities should insulate the dwellings of households, earning € 1,500 per month, 
which experience a noise increase from 20 to 30 Ku, if the once-only costs of insulation are below this 
amount of € 5,292. It should be noticed that the amounts are rather small.  
We remind the reader that these amounts refer to residual effects. Total shadow costs have been defined as 
the sum of the price differential and the residual compensation. In the present case we see from the 
Appendix that house prices in the Greater Amsterdam Area do not significantly depend on noise nuisance. 
Undoubtedly, this has to be explained by the chaotic situation in the Amsterdam housing market. It follows 
that, in this case, the estimated residual effect will approximately equal the total noise effect, as there is no 
price differential observed. 
 
6.2.  Cost of compensation to society 
 
An important policy question now is what the total amount of compensation would be if all the 
population living around Schiphol were to be compensated for the noise nuisance which they suffer. 
This means that we have to compute the residual cost compensation per household in the area 
involved, taking into account that different households have different incomes,and experience 
different levels of Ku. Subsequently, the compensation amounts for all households concerned have to 
be aggregated. 
Suppose we set a critical Ku limit of x Ku, for example. What is the percentage of households having a 
noise nuisance level higher than x Ku? And, what would be the amount needed in order to compensate  
them for the excess nuisance? In Table 7 below, we have calculated these figures for five threshold 
levels. 
 
                                                           
12 The exchange rate at the time of the survey was approximately USA$ 1 = € 1. 
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Table 7: Total yearly amount of compensation (in €) 
 Ku  Number of households 
concerned
1 
Average monthly compensation per 
household concerned 
Total yearly amount of 
compensation 
 > 20 Ku  148,063 (17.9%)  56.63  100.62 million 
 > 25 Ku  80,478 (  9.7%)  41.46  40.04 million 
 > 30 Ku  26,734 (  3.2%)  29.90  9.59 million 
 > 35 Ku  11,851 (  1.4%)  20.90  2.97 million 
 > 40 Ku  6,030 (  0.7%)  17.13  1.24 million 
1  Of the total population in the Schiphol region. 
2  In absolute numbers and (in brackets) as a percentage. 
 
To be precise, we have computed the accumulated  compensation necessary to compensate the nuisance 
level for all people suffering from a damage level of y Ku (y>x) over the chosen level of x Ku. Table 7 
shows that the average monthly amount of compensation per household for a bottom level of 20 Ku is 
higher than the average amounts for higher critical levels. That is logical, because the lower the critical 
level is laid, the higher the number of Ku that have to be compensated. This is shown even more clearly in 
column 4 of the table, where the total amount of annual compensation is given. To put the amounts in table 
7 into the right perspective, we have to relate them to the number of commercial flights (about 397,000 in 
1999 at Schiphol) or to the number of passengers (about 36.8 million in 1999). Consequently, if we 
suppose that the government were to choose 20 Ku as the critical level, the compensation per flight would 
amount to € 253.45 and the compensation to be paid per passenger would be € 2.73. 
 
7.  Discussion and conclusions 
 
We developed in this paper a novel methodological extension to assess the effect of an externality. It may 
be applied in cost benefit analysis to assess the value of intangibles. The problem with an externality is that 
it is frequently not completely accounted for by market price differentials. If prices fully reflect the 
externality differences, the costs are readily assessed by the hedonic price method where prices in 
externality-affected situations are compared with not affected situations. However, there are many cases 
where prices only partly compensate for the influence of the externality. This is especially probable when 
individuals are in a situation, where the physical and/or emotional transaction costs attached to changing 
that situation are high. The Amsterdam housing market and its painful relationship with Amsterdam 
Airport is a point in case.  
In this paper, we estimated the residual shadow cost of aircraft noise nuisance on the basis of subjective 
questions about the satisfaction with 'life as a whole' and the subjective perception of aircraft noise. A 
significant non-zero noise effect estimate is a positive test for the hypothesis that price differentials are not 
noise-compensating. We assessed the monetary counter-value of that residual effect. Since in the 
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Amsterdam case (see Appendix) prices appear not to correlate with noise differences, in this case the value 
of the residual cost component equals the total cost of the externality.   
The monetary compensation amounts found are derived from a model including both well-being and the 
subjectively perceived noise nuisance. The compensation amounts differ according to whether or not the 
dwelling is noise-insulated. This result gives the tool for a cost- benefit analysis to compare the value of 
once-for-all noise –insulation with permanent monthly compensation to inhabitants.  
To our knowledge this is the first time that (residual) noise nuisance effects have been monetarily 
evaluated by means of the Cantril-question. It is obvious that this external effect could only be measured 
due to the fact that noise nuisance varies a lot over the Amsterdam area and that the noise burden is pretty 
accurately registered according to zip codes, making it possible to link objective noise nuisance with the 
subjective feelings of the individuals living there. The same model may be used to evaluate air traffic noise 
at other places in the world.  
The advantage of this extended model, compared to traditional hedonic price analysis, is that it does not 
assume equilibrium on the housing market as a starting point. Although almost always postulated, 
equilibrium is a rather restrictive assumption, and, as our empirical findings in this paper suggest, not 
maintainable for the greater Amsterdam Area. The advantage of satisfaction questions compared to the 
CVM approach is that the respondent is not aware or made to believe that his or her responses may have 
any influence on decisions or compensations in which he or she has an interest. Hence, strategic response 
behavior is highly unlikely in our study. As we need only a few questions, it will be easy to include them 
in routine surveys or opinion polls, which may imply a major cost reduction on data collection. The final 
point, which should be mentioned, is that the method effectually tests whether the externality is completely 
reflected in market prices or not.  
One question, which falls outside the scope of this study, is the question whether a noise compensation 
schedule is politically desirable. It does right to the idea that the polluter pays for the damage and 
accordingly will reduce the pollution. For reasons of justice there is much to say for the polluter-pays-
principle. It might be that the compensation is family size-dependent. For political reasons this seems 
unacceptable in the Dutch circumstances. 
The method is clearly applicable on other situations as well. First, we may look at other airports all 
over the world. We leave it to the fantasy of the reader to invent other externality types where the 
method would be valuable. We mention other types of traffic, e.g. road traffic, the effects of traffic 
regulation policies, environmental damages, creation of nature resorts, public transport effects, supply 
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Appendix. The relation between housing costs and noise nuisance. 
 
We did some additional regressions, where we attempted to find a relationship between Ln(housing costs ) and noise, 
as measured by the Kosten –-unit. Housing costs are defined as the rent or the cost of mortgage. The latter is 
somewhat difficult as older loans may be amortized. We tried a number of equations, for tenants and for owners and 
for the two sub-samples taken together. We were not able to find a sensible (that is negative significant) noise effect. 
We present the simplest estimates in table 8 below. 
This table shows that the most important determinant of housing costs is the length of the period one has been living 




housing costs are. This is the immediate effect of the rent control, described in Section 4, coupled with the soaring 
building prices for new houses. Hence, rents are basically determined by historical building prices. For owners of 
houses their mortgage costs are based on the historical purchase price in a similar way. Given the advantage of 
staying in your house and the existence of a considerable sales tax, it is no surprise that Dutchmen do not move easily 
from one house to another. The noise effect is insignificant, which indicates that we are near the point of 'no 
compensation. The dummy effects are reasonable, although most are non – significant. 
We tried about twenty other specifications including some with interactions between K and 'years lived in the house' 
and with the subjective variable noise.  We also tried those specifications on the two sub-samples of owners and 
renters. All those specifications yielded similar results. Apart from the housing types only 'years lived in the house' 
yielded a major effect, while the noise effect remained non-significant. We conclude that, referring to the reasons 
listed before, the noise burden is hardly or not at all reflected in prices in the Schiphol area. 
Table 8 Ln(housing costs) explained 
Variable Estimate  t-value 
Constant   7.23   93.05 
Dummies for housing type (def. House in a row)    
Detached family home  0.16      2.31 
Two under one roof  0.12  1.58 
Corner family home  0.04  0.62 
Flat -0.29  -6.71 
Other   -0.21  -2.08 
Ln(age of the house)  -0.02  -0.81 
Ln(years lived in the house)  -0.17  -9.97 
Ln(Ku)   0.02  1.56 
R
2 = 0.143 , N=1017 
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